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THE COMMON LAW OF PUBLIC NUISANCE IN 
STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 
By Kenneth S. Boger* 
INTRODUCTION 
Developments in the use of a federal doctrine of common law of 
public nuisance to enjoin pollution of interstate and navigable bod-
ies of water! have received considerable recent attention.2 In Illinois 
v. City of Milwaukee,3 the United States Supreme Court affirmed 
a District Court decree granting injunctive relief to the state of 
Illinois against an out-of-state municipal polluter, the City of Mil-
waukee, on public nuisance grounds.4 The federal common law doc-
trine of public nuisance has been invoked successfully by the federal 
government to enjoin pollution by a private business concern, 5 and 
by both the federal government and a state to secure injunctive 
relief against a private party engaged in intrastate pollution of an 
interstate body of water.· However, despite this apparent expansion 
of federal remedies available to both the states and to the federal 
government, official federal policy as expressed in the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act is to place primary pollution control 
responsibility in the hands of the states.7 Though the availability of 
federal remedies is useful in some situations, there are pressing 
environmental pollution problems which are clearly outside the 
scope of federal jurisdiction.8 This article will examine the doctrine 
of common law public nuisance as it has been applied in recent state 
court decisions,· focusing in particular upon the Pennsylvania case 
of Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker Company,1O (hereinafter 
cited as Barnes and Tucker). The objectives are threefold: to ex-
plain that decision in light of traditional common law public nuis-
ance doctrine; to relate its significant aspects to current develop-
ments in other jurisdictions; and to identify the difficulties involved 
in using the legal theory of public nuisance as a means of pollution 
control at the state level. 
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I. PRIVATE AND PUBLIC NUISANCE 
The term "nuisance" describes a particular type of injury rather 
than a kind of proscribed conduct. A common law nuisance may 
result from activity which is either negligent or intentional. 11 The 
essence of nuisance is the unreasonable and substantial invasion of 
the interests of others, either by action or inaction.12 Two categories 
of nuisance are recognized depending upon the nature of the inter-
ests invaded. A private nuisance involves interference with a 
property-owner's use and enjoyment of land. 13 Judicial relief will 
depend upon a weighing of such factors as the gravity of the harm, 
the character of the harm14 and the possibility of avoiding it, the 
offsetting social value of the conduct creating the nuisance, and the 
appropriateness of the locality in which the conduct takes place. IS 
If a private nuisance is found to exist, the injured party may recover 
damages or, in some instances, obtain injunctive relief. 18 
On the other hand, the common law has long recognized the pub-
lic's right to be free from certain interferences with the public 
safety, public morals, public peace, and public welfare; interfer-
ences which are collectively known as public nuisances. 17 A public 
nuisance must involve interference with public interests generally, 
and not solely with the interests of a few individuals. The cause of 
action for public nuisance rests primarily with the state. A private 
person may bring an action for public nuisance only if he has suf-
fered thereby some "special injury" or "particular damage" not 
incurred by the public generally. IS Whether courts have been uni-
form in requiring special injury in kind, or have occasionally granted 
standing to private individuals injured specially in degree only, has 
been the subject of some debate. 19 At present, however, it is clear 
that public nuisance actions are most readily available to represent-
atives of the state or municipal government. Though public nuis-
ance traditionally constitutes a crime, equitable relief may issue if 
the criminal penalty is deemed insufficient to prevent the appre-
hended damage. 20 Modern cases in the environmental field seldom 
discuss the criminal aspects of the public nuisance doctrine. 
The availability of common law public nuisance as an alternative 
to state administrative or statutory enforcement mechanisms can 
have important environmental consequences. Administrative reme-
dies are often slow and cumbersome. While hearings take place and 
administrative orders await judicial enforcement, the polluting ac-
tivity continues. Public nuisance actions can provide potentially 
faster relief.21 Further, statutory or administrative remedies may not 
be applicable to particular fact situations, or for various reasons the 
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individuals charged with enforcement of environmental legislation 
may be reluctant to act.22 Since one may not acquire a prescriptive 
right to maintain a public nuisance, nor invoke the defenses of 
laches or the statute of limitations,23 the action is available when 
other theories might fail. At the very least, a common law public 
nuisance action might serve to plug loopholes that develop in an 
otherwise comprehensive statutory scheme, as the Barnes and 
Tucker case illustrates. 
II. COMMONWEALTH V. BARNES AND TUCKER COMPANY 
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Barnes and Tucker 
Company,24 had been engaged for thirty years in active deep mining 
operations at its Mine No. 15 until work was terminated and the 
mine was closed and sealed in July, 1969. Throughout the period of 
operation defendant had possessed valid water drainage permits as 
required by the Pennsylvania Clean Streams Law. 25 The permits 
were issued by the Sanitary Water Board,28 a state administrative 
agency charged with control of water pollution under the Clean 
Streams Law, upon its approval of proposed drainage plans submit-
ted periodically by the company.27 In June, 1970, approximately one 
year after the closing of the mine, the natural discharge of acid mine 
water was discovered at two separate locations.28 The Department 
of Environmental Resources immediately filed a bill in equity in the 
Commonwealth Court seeking preliminary and permanent injuc-
tions requiring the defendant to chemically neutralize the dis-
charge, on four grounds: (1) that defendant as a discharge permit 
holder assumed responsibility for treatment of acid mine drainage 
occurring after cessation of operations, under sections 306, 307 and 
315 of the 1965 Amendment to the Clean Streams Law;29 (2) that 
defendant assumed responsibility for abatement of the discharge 
under section 316 of the 1970 Amendments,30 which empowered the 
Sanitary Water Board in the event of mine discharge to order the 
offending party to correct the condition; (3) that the discharge con-
stituted a statutory public nuisance under section 3 of the 1970 
Amendments;31 (4) that the discharge constituted an abatable com-
mon law public nuisance for which the defendant was responsible. 32 
After the issuance of a preliminary injunction and a hearing on 
the merits, the lower court denied permanent injunctive relief, find-
ing that the defendant was not responsible for the discharge under 
any of the four theories advanced by the Department. The court 
held that since the law prior to the 1970 Amendments had referred 
only to "operators"33 of mines and to those engaged in "opening, 
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reopening or operating"34 the same, it did not place responsibility 
on the mine owner for postmining discharge when the mine had 
been operated and sealed in conformity with a valid permit.35 Sec-
tion 316 of the 1970 Amendment was deemed inapplicable because 
no order had issued from the Sanitary Water Board or the Depart-
ment of Environmental Resources requiring the defendant to abate 
the pollution, as provided for in that section.3ft As a consequence, 
section 316 was not available to the plaintiff. The court also rejected 
the plaintiff's claim of statutory public nuisance by finding that 
discharge of pollutants into "unclean" waters was not proscribed 
until passage of the 1970 Amendment,37 and that section 3 of that 
Amendment was inapplicable because, in its view, the operative 
facts of the cause of action arose before 1970. Lastly, with respect 
to the common law public nuisance count, the court stated: " . . . 
we cannot declare . . . that a breakout of mine water through the 
forces of nature adjunctive to said artificial condition [the sealed 
mine shaft], constitutes a public nuisance for which B & T is re-
sponsible today."38 In so holding the court appeared to rely upon an 
oft-distinguished but never expressly overruled opinion in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 3D (hereinafter cited as 
Sanderson) a private nuisance case asserting the right of an upper 
riparian mine owner to "lead" mine water, accumulating during the 
normal and natural course of mining operations, out of his mine and 
into streams which form the natural drainage basin.40 
On appeal the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed in substance 
with the lower court's dismissal of counts one and two, but held that 
the Department of Environmental Resources nevertheless could 
maintain an action under either the statutory or the common law 
theories of public nuisance. 41 With respect to the statutory action, 
the court cited section 3 of the 1970 Amendment, which identifies 
as a public nuisance any ". . . discharge of sewage or industrial 
waste or any substance into the waters of this Commonwealth, 
which causes or contributes to pollution ... or creates a danger of 
such pollution ... ," and section 601, providing for the abatement 
of nuisances". . . in the manner provided by law or equity. . . . "42 
Since any privilege of discharging mine water which may have been 
conferred upon mine operators by past legislation was effectively 
withdrawn by section 3, and since that section was merely declara-
tory of the common law which had at all times provided for water 
pollution abatement, the court saw no problem of retroactive statu-
tory application with respect to the 1970 Amendments. "Legislative 
withdrawal of a prior grant of a privilege is not retrospective legisla-
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tion."43 It is the discharge itself, rather than the activities producing 
it, which is the nuisance to be abated under section 601. 
The court then approved the use of a common law nuisance theory 
as a valid alternative grounds for action, noting that although dis-
cussion of alternative bases for liability was not normally under-
taken, doing so was necessary in order to clarify the common law of 
public nuisance in the state.44 As to the applicability of public nuis-
ance doctrine to water pollution, the court found that it was unnec-
essary to determine whether an asserted public interest (in this case, 
recreational use of water resources) in the water allegedly polluted 
was sufficient to justify an injunction, " . . . since we believe the 
public has a sufficient interest in clean stre.ams alone regardless of 
any specific use thereof."45 Since the record was not sufficient to 
indicate feasible means for corrective action, the case was remanded 
for formulation of specific relief which would not be unduly harsh 
on the defendant. 4ft 
Barnes and Tucker thus provides common law recognition of a 
strong public interest in clean streams sufficient to override the 
alleged right of industrial property owners, enunciated in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Sanderson, to foul the public waterways. 
Faced with an obvious danger to the public health, safety or welfare 
resulting from a particular polluting activity, courts have readily 
provided abatement remedies to the state in public nuisance ac-
tions. 47 The public interest in such cases is clear and immediate, and 
the exercise of state police power is maintainable against a property 
owner's defense of "taking" without due process.48 However, the 
value to society of clean streams generally, absent pollution threats 
to public health or safety, is less tangible, especially when balanced 
against the concrete costs to polluters (and often others) which pol-
lution abatement usually entails. From this perspective, the court's 
treatments of any substantial water pollution as a public nuisance 
is significant. A public nuisance has been defined as " . . . an act 
or omission 'which obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to 
the public in the exercise of rights common to all . . .' "49 The 
Barnes and Tucker court makes clear that the maintenance of clean 
streams constitutes such a "public right", and that acid mine drain-
age into any stream produces actionable "damage." 
In granting relief to the Commonwealth on a public nuisance 
theory, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania offers an example of 
successful extra-statutory state court action against alleged pollu-
ters. The principle inherent in that decision may be applicable be-
yond water pollution to all types of environmental damage. How-
372 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
ever, before this common law approach can be employed success-
fully in an environmental lawsuit, several obstacles, dealt with ei-
ther explicitly or implicitly by the Pennsylvania court, must be 
overcome. These pitfalls will be examined below in light of Barnes 
and Tucker and analogous recent cases in other jurisdictions. 
III. PREEMPTION AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION 
Though the Pennsylvania legislature had adopted a broad plan to 
rid the state of polluted waters through administrative regulation 
and supervision, the state Supreme Court nonetheless affirmed, in 
Barnes and Tucker, the survival of a common law public nuisance 
action to abate pollution.50 This finding is consistent with section 
701 of the Clean Streams Law,51 which provided specifically for the 
survival of common law rights of action, and is in accord with simi-
lar holdings in other jurisdictions. 52 If a provision of the relevant 
statute indicates clearly that the remedies it creates are not in-
tended to be exclusive, then courts generally will recognize a concur-
rent common law right of action.53 However, if there is no such 
provision, a problem of implied legislative intent arises. Though 
most jurisdictions will indulge in a presumption favoring survival of 
the independent common law action,S( others, if the statutory rem-
edy is wide in scope, will draw opposite conclusions as to legislative 
intent. 55 If the statute contains no provisions in derogation of the 
common law, and if there is no clear expression elsewhere (e.g. 
legislative reports) of legislative intent that statutory remedies be 
exclusive, then it seems most reasonable to suppose that common 
law rights of action survive. 58 Common law actions can serve a useful 
function in plugging loopholes which might develop ~n an otherwise 
extensive statutory scheme, and the legislature may always clarify 
the point subsequently if it did, in fact, intend particular statutory 
remedies to be comprehensive. It has been argued that extensive 
administrative enforcement plans by their very nature imply exclu-
sion of common law rights in the areas which they coverY However, 
in such instances the more appropriate principle to apply would 
seem to be the doctrine of primary jurisdiction (discussed below), 
rather than that of preemption. 
Though the common law may not be preempted by legislation in 
a particular area, the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" may still 
be applied to defeat initial resort to a common law remedy. That 
doctrine, a judicially created device designed to improve the coordi-
nation of effort between administrative agencies and courts,58 was 
first invoked in the federal court system, and was applied despite a 
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specific legislative grant of authority to the courts to act on a claim 
in the first instance.59 The doctrine has since been applied by many 
state courts as well. 80 It arises when a particular claim, though origi-
nally cognizable in the courts, is thought to involve questions which 
might better be determined in the first instance by an existing ad-
ministrative agency.81 A court will invoke the doctrine upon consid-
eration of the necessity for uniformity and consistency in the admin-
istration of particular legislative schemes; the existence of particu-
lar expertise possessed by the relevant agency; judicial efficiency 
and economy; and the importance of administrative autonomy.82 
"The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not necessarily allocate 
power between courts and agencies for it governs only the question 
whether courts or agency will initially decide a particular issue, not 
the question whether court or agency will finally decide the issue. "63 
Where the doctrine is applied, the court will either dismiss the 
action or stay the proceeding pending an administrative determina-
tion of the question.84 
In the context of this article, the issue of primary jurisdiction 
might be raised when an attorney general, a comparable state offi-
cial, a municipal authority, or a private individual under appropri-
ate circumstances,85 attempted to enjoin pollution of water or air 
under a common law public nuisance theory. If the doctrine were 
invoked the plaintiff would be forced to file a complaint with the 
appropriate state administrative agency. This might be unsatisfac-
tory to the plaintiff for a number of reasons, among them the inabil-
ity of the agency to give the specific reliefrequested;68 the possibility 
of undue delay before administrative investigatory and hearing pro-
cedures can be set in motion;87 or the influence of possibly biased 
fact-findings upon the substantive issues, if later heard by the 
court.8S 
In Barnes and Tucker the Pennsylvania court did not mention the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction, and it was apparently not raised by 
the defendants in the court below.89 Recently however, two jurisdic-
tions have squarely confronted the issue and may have set a course 
for the future handling of the doctrine in environmental suits.70 In 
State v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,71 (hereinafter cited as 
Dairyland Power), the attorney general of Wisconsin attempted to 
enjoin a public nuisance under the authority of a sixty-year-old 
statute empowering him, or any person affected, to bring nuisance 
actions under certain circumstances. The defendant argued that in 
light of the broad scope of recent state environmental legislation, 
which had empowered the Department of Natural Resources to in-
vestigate air, water and solid waste disposal pollution and to hold 
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hearings and issue abatement orders, the court should invoke the 
doctrine of primary jurisdiction and dismiss the action. 72 The court 
instead affirmed the lower court's overruling of a demurrer to the 
complaint made, inter alia, on this ground. Arguing in support of 
the demurrer, the defendant indicated its intention to introduce a 
large quantity of technical evidence bearing upon the feasibility of 
abating the pollution, and suggested that an administrative agency 
might be better equipped than the court to evaluate this data. The 
court disagreed. "In this case issues of law, rather than issues of 
fact, appear to be paramount. "73 The court noted, that irrespective 
of the technical feasibility of pollution abatement, the crucial ques-
tions presented by the case were whether relief should be granted 
to the plaintiff on the facts, and if so, what kind. These questions 
involve fundamental policy judgments which the court apparently 
considered unsuitable for administrative determination. 74 
A similar approach was taken in State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa 
Electric CO.,15 (hereinafter cited as Tampa Electric). There, the 
Florida attorney general brought a public nuisance suit against the 
defendant to enjoin air pollution allegedly constituting a danger to 
public health. The trial court dismissed, invoking the primary juris-
diction doctrine in light of state air and water pollution statutes 
which established a Department of Pollution Control to deal with 
pollution problems. The court justified dismissal'" ... in the 
interest of orderly procedure, standardizing pollution control, and 
reconciling the interest of the public, along with necessary indus-
try.' "78 The Florida Court of Appeals reversed, asserting that the 
determination of what constitutes a public nuisance is historically 
a judicial function, and involves issues not so intimately bound with 
technical fact considerations as to be more appropriately heard by 
administrative experts. 77 
If the common law of public nuisance is to have the effect of 
supplementing legislative programs that fail to provide, for various 
reasons, full and complete remedies to particular environmental 
wrongs, then courts must be open to the particular facts of each case 
brought before them, and aware of the environmental implications 
in each case of forcing plaintiffs to resort to alternative administra-
tive channels. However, to the extent that Dairyland Power and 
Tampa Electric represent the view that only courts are competent 
to make judgments in the area, they may be ill-considered. Such a 
view carried to extremes could threaten the independent exercise of 
agency authority and limit the efficacy of comprehensive legislative 
schemes for pollution control. Some analysts have argued that ad-
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ministrative agencies can be more flexible and effective in dealing 
with particular environmental problems than the courts,78 and the 
possibilities in this regard should be given weight. Further, techni-
cal expertise possessed by administrative bodies may be of consider-
able value when the feasibility of abatement techniques is at issue. 
The policy question of whether or not relief should be granted may 
be inextricably linked with the technical question of whether abate-
ment is possible, especially when the defendant is a public utility 
providing a necessary service, as in Dairyland Power and Tampa 
Electric. 
It should be noted here that if an administrative proceeding is 
preferred to the institution of an independent action for public nuis-
ance, then judicial review of any initial administrative action under 
a statutory scheme may be delayed by the doctrine of exhaustion 
of administrative remedies. 79 In such a case the basis for an immedi-
ate judicial appeal from an initial agency ruling would not involve 
a public nuisance action. This article being concerned only with the 
latter theory, the exhaustion doctrine will not be examined here. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORIZATION 
One important issue specifically left unresolved by Barnes and 
Tucker is whether a public nuisance can exist despite legislative, 
administrative or municipal authorization of the particular activity 
in question. The court stated that the legislature could, within con-
stitutionallimits,80 authorize conduct which otherwise would consti-
tute a nuisance, but found that although the defendent operated in 
accordance with the Clean Streams Law, its discharge of acid mine 
water during that period was at best "permitted", but not "author-
ized", by the legislature.8! The defense of legislative authorization 
was not available to it. This finding is consistent with the generally 
strict scrutiny given by courts to statutes under which legislative 
authorization to maintain a nuisance is claimed.82 Any grant of 
authority must be explicit, and an alleged grant may be held not to 
extend to a particularly obnoxious means of accomplishing an other-
wise permitted activity.83 Thus in a suit by the New York state 
attorney general to enjoin the operation of a methadone mainte-
nance facility for drug addicts on public nuisance grounds,84 the 
court affirmed a lower court grant of injunctive relief, despite defen-
dant's argument that the maintenance program was operated pur-
suant to the New York Public Health Law and was licensed, certi-
fied or inspected by various state and federal agencies. The evi-
dence, said the court, supported allegations in the plaintiff's com-
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plaint that the facility, though authorized, was being operated in an 
offensive manner.85 
In the face of an explicit legislative authorization it would seem 
unreasonable, absent constitutional necessity, to allow the execu-
tive branch of government to maintain a public nuisance action.86 
Most of the cases are in accord on this pointY However, when the 
alleged "authorization" is not explicit, as in Barnes and Tucker, or 
where a subordinate governmental body (an agency or a municipal-
ity) has allegedly "authorized" the activity, a division of opinion 
begins to develop.88 Usually at issue in such cases is the immunity 
derivable from administrative agency permits and similar grants of 
authority, and from municipal zoning ordinances. 
In Barnes and Tucker the Department of Environmental Re-
sources had revoked the defendant's mine drainage permit prior to 
commencement of the action. Therefore the court was not " . . . 
called upon to decide the more difficult question of whether a public 
nuisance can exist during the pendency of a valid mine drainage 
permit" (emphasis added).89 Several recent cases in other jurisdic-
tions have dealt at least incidentally with this issue. In Venuto v. 
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation,90 (hereinafter cited as 
Venuto), plaintiffs, as private individuals, sought an injunction and 
damages against defendant for both public and private nuisance, 
based upon injury allegedly suffered as a result of air pollution from 
defendant's plants. Defendant was operating within air purity stan-
dards set by the Bay Area Pollution Control District. While holding 
that plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a public nuisance action,91 
the court stated in dicta that the proper public authorities could 
have maintained such an action because, " . . . we find nothing in 
the statutes delineating the authority of the District which gave it 
the express authority to permit commercial enterprises to engage in 
activities which the law pronounces to be a nuisance. "92 Thus the 
strict scrutiny standards often used by courts in evaluating the 
scope of alleged legislative authorization of nuisance activities 
might be extended similarly to a review of the specific legislative 
grant of authority to a particular administrative agency. 
Another approach was taken by the Michigan Supreme Court in 
Ebel v. Saginaw County Board of Road Commissioners,93 (herein-
after cited as Ebel). Plaintiff, a private party, alleged that a rail-
road's placement of a flashing light signal in the center of the street 
at a railroad crossing constituted a public nuisance. In defense, the 
railroad pointed to a specific order from the Michigan Public Utili-
ties Commission requiring such placement, and noted a Michigan 
statute prohibiting the removal of crossing signals without the au-
PUBLIC NUISANCE 377 
thority to do SO.94 The court held: "No state agency is free to main-
tain a nuisance, and hence it cannot permit or require another per-
son to do so. "95 
Administrative agencies are often established to control pollution 
actively case by case, but zoning laws are designed to set aside 
specific geographic areas within which otherwise obnoxious activity 
may be pursued. The recent Colorado case of Green v. Castle Con-
crete CO.,86 (hereinafter cited as Green), indicates that zoning au-
thorization may be a more difficult obstacle to the maintenance of 
common law nuisance actions than permits or licensing by an ad-
ministrative agency. In Green the defendant planned quarrying op-
erations in an area zoned for such activity, and plaintiffs sought an 
injunction on both public and private nuisance grounds, alleging97 
that the dust from defendant's operations would obscure the view 
of nearby mountains and that operations would drastically affect 
the tourist trade in the area. The lower court found the quarry to 
be both a public and a private nuisance and permanently enjoined 
the quarrying operation. The Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, 
framing the public nuisance issue as: " ... whether the operation 
of a limestone quarry-a permissible activity by legislative zoning 
action-can by judicial decree be deemed a public nuisance. "98 
Stating that the common law of public nuisance was preeIppted by 
legislative statutory and zoning regulations, the court dismissed the 
action, stressing its view that the reordering of societal rights and 
priorities, which attention to environmental aesthetics would re-
quire, could not be attempted under the guise of judicial nuisance 
abatement, but was rather a matter of legislative concern.99 A strong 
dissent was registered by Chief Justice Pringle. lOu The court indi-
cated that the plaintiffs could bring their private nuisance action 
in the future, if and when the issue became ripe. lUI Presumably, the 
availability of injunctive relief in such an action would depend upon 
a balancing of the equities involved. lu2 
Though Green may stand for the proposition that an activity 
permitted under a legislatively enacted zoning plan cannot consti-
tute an enjoinable public nuisance, it may still permit a public 
nuisance action simply to abate resulting pollution, where it is abat-
able without destruction of the enterprise. Future production of 
excessive dust might be seen as relating merely to the manner in 
which defendant is using his property. However, Green is especially 
interesting from an environmental point of view because it repre-
sents an implicit refusal by the court to consider aesthetic impair-
ment of the environment, absent other types of damage, to be a 
proper subject for judicial action. Not having a statutory statement 
378 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
of public policy analogous to that which influenced the Barnes and 
Tucker court,103 the Colorado court was arguably correct in viewing 
such a subject as beyond judicial competence. 
V. PRIVATE ACTIONS FOR PUBLIC NUISANCE 
A serious obstacle to the emergence of the common law of public 
nuisance as a major environmental weapon at the state level is what 
has been termed the standing problem. 104 In order for a private 
individual to bring an action for public nuisance, he must suffer 
"special injury" different in kindl05 from that suffered by the public 
in general. If it can be shown that the plaintiff's injury is merely 
different in degree but not in kind, then the action will be dis-
missed. IOG 
The advantages to environmentalists of a private action for public 
nuisance are clear. State officials may be the only parties authorized 
to pursue statutory remedies created by environmental legisla-
tion,107 and past experience has shown that state agencies and gov-
ernmental officials are often less than effective in dealing with envi-
ronmental problems, either due to the influence of economically 
powerful pressure groups or to a sheer lack of resources. 108 Moreover 
a mandamus action is generally not available to private citizens to 
force initiation of action by state government officials,109 absent sta-
tutory provisions to the contrary yo Since the availability of private 
nuisance actions is unlikely to benefit the general public in any 
great measure, especially if private remedies are limited to damage 
recoverylll and if the traditional balancing of equities is involved,1I2 
there are frequent instances in which widespread injury occurs but 
no one, public or private, is able or willing to pursue a remedy. 
The formerly unanimous agreement among jurisdictions with re-
spect to this standing question has been upset recently by a Florida 
lower court decision, Save Sand Key, Inc. v. United States Steel,1I3 
(hereinafter cited as Save Sand Key). Plaintiff organization, a non-
profit citizen's group claiming vested prescriptive rightsll4 along 
with the general public in a particular ocean beach owned by the 
defendant, sought to enjoin as a public nuisance a barrier placed by 
the defendant in such a location as to interfere with those rights. 115 
The defendant maintained, inter alia, that plaintiff had suffered no 
injury distinct in kind from that of the public in general and there-
fore lacked standing to bring the action. The District Court of Ap-
peals, however, reversed the lower court's dismissal of the action 
and remanded for trial on the merits. Not only did the court find 
that plaintiff organization was a proper representative of its mem-
bers' interests,IIG but it also held generally". . . that a person who 
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is entitled to enjoyment of a right or who directly and personally 
suffers or is about to suffer an injury may sue for relief or redress 
whether or not such right or injury is special to him or is shared in 
common with the public generally" (emphasis added).117 The court 
was influenced by a perceived federal trend toward liberalization of 
standing rules, as evidenced by Flast v. Cohen, 118 and by a provision 
of the Florida Constitution that the state's courts" ... shall be 
open to every person for redress of any injury."119 The court con-
ceived the case before it as one involving an injury for which there 
would be no redress without liberalized standing requirements. l20 
Dismissing arguments that the holding would lead to a multiplicity 
of suits-the problem it believed basic to the old "special injury" 
rule-the court cited the increased expense of litigation, the more 
frequent use of class actions, and the precedential value of prior 
cases as modern developments which rendered the old rule 
obsolete. 121 
If the opinion in Save Sand Key is followed in subsequent Florida 
cases, that state would become the first to sanction private actions 
for public nuisance without a showing of special injury. If standing 
is allowed to a private person asserting public rights in property 
acquired from another by prescription, there would seem to be no 
reason why the principle could not be broadened to include private 
vindication of public rights in public property such as water122 and 
air, and further to include even interference with asserted public 
rights which are not property-based. 123 This latter course would be 
consistent with the history of public nuisance which, unlike private 
nuisance, was not founded on interference with interests in land. 124 
It should be noted that a deep judicial incursion into the broad 
realm of public environmental rights, to which the Florida holding 
might lead, could quickly bring courts into areas of outright social 
planning, with which they are ill-equipped to deal. The vigor of 
public nuisance enforcement by state officials, as opposed to private 
parties, is ultimately a function of the political process, and to the 
extent that this process reflects the diverse and legitimately con-
flicting interests involved in every environmental controversy it may 
produce the most equitable resolution of environmental questions. 
Concern for the environment raises complex cost-benefit issues and 
requires the weighing of conflicting values. Public nuisance enforce-
ment might be more appropriately left to those who are in some 
measure directly accountable to the public for the resolution of 
those issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Barnes and Tucker declared 
the doctrine of common law public nuisance to be a viable tool in 
the fight against water pollution, supplementary to administrative 
and legislative programs in that area. In the process, the courts 
established the fact of water pollution as a common law public 
nuisance, actionable whenever it occurs. Environmentalists in other 
jurisdictions might find the doctrine useful if obstacles to its use, 
such as preemption, primary jurisdiction and legislative authoriza-
tion are overcome. However, the ultimate common law environmen-
tal weapon, the private action to enjoin a public nuisance before it 
occurs, has yet to be clearly accepted by the highest court in any 
jurisdiction without adherence to traditionally strict standing re-
quirements. Arguably, liberalized standing would carry with it dan-
gers of judicial overreaching which should be avoided. 
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Partial Statutory Texts 
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Act of May 8,1945, P.L. 435, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 691.313 (1964): 
"Before any existing or new coal mine may be opened or reopened, and 
before any existing coal mine may be continued in operation, a plan of 
the proposed drainage and disposal of industrial wastes, and acid mine 
drainage of such mine, shall be submitted to the Sanitary Water Board, 
and it shall be unlawful to open or reopen any such mine, or to continue 
the operation of any mine . . . unless and until the board . . . has 
approved such plan or change of plan ... " (Repealed by the 1970 
amendments) . 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 691.307 (virtually unaffected by the 1965 
amendments) : 
"No person shall hereafter erect, construct or open, or reopen or operate, 
any establishment which, in its operation, results in the discharge of 
industrial wastes which would flow or be discharged into any of the 
waters of the Commonwealth and thereby cause a pollution of the same, 
unless such person shall first provide proper and adequate treatment 
works ... approved by the board ... " 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 691.315 (part of 1965 amendments): 
"(a) Before any coal mine is opened, reopened, or continued in opera-
tion, an application for a permit approving the proposed drainage and 
disposal of industrial wastes shall be submitted to the Sanitary Water 
Board ... " 
"(b) It shall be unlawful to open, reopen or continue in operation any 
coal mine. . . unless and until the board. . . has issued a permit. . ." 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 691.316 (Supp. 1974) (Part of the 1970 
amendments): 
"Whenever the Sanitary Water Board finds that pollution or a danger 
of pollution is resulting from a condition which exists on land in the 
Commonwealth the Board may order the landowner or occupier to cor-
rect the condition in a manner satisfactory to the Board or it may order 
such owner or occupier to allow a mine operator or other person or 
agency of the Commonwealth access to the land to take such action. For 
the purpose of this section, 'landowner' includes any person holding title 
to or having a proprietary interest in either surface or subsurface rights." 
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 35, § 691.3 (Supp. 1974) (Part of the 1970 amend-
ments): 
"The discharge of sewage or industrial waste ['industrial waste' was 
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defined to include mine drainage in the 1965 amendments] or any 
substance into the waters of this Commonwealth, which causes or con-
tributes to pollution as herein defined or creates a danger of such pollu-
tion is hereby declared not to be a reasonable or natural use of such 
waters, to be against public policy, and to be a public nuisance." 
-.~>--.-
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(Supp. 1974). 
8 For example, pollution which does not involve interstate or na-
vigable bodies of water. 
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18 Id. at 586. One recent Florida case suggests that this rule may 
be changing. See text, infra, at n. 113. Some states have attempted 
to create by statute the right of a private individual to bring an 
action for public nuisance with no special injury requirement. See 
Prosser, supra n. 11, at 587, n. 68. 
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dies to abate air pollution were intended to be exclusive; and Brook-
haven Borough v. American Rendering, Inc., 434 Pa. 290, 256 A.2d 
626 (1969), where a common law right to enjoin air pollution was 
held to lie following an amendment to the Air Pollution Control Act, 
preserving explicitly common law rights and remedies. 
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83 McKim v. Philadelphia, 217 Pa. 243, 66 A. 340 (1906). 
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(1974). 
85 ld. at __ ,352 N.Y.S.2d at 488. Plaintiff alleged that the indi-
viduals who frequented the center were loud and boisterous, that 
drugs were openly sold both within and immediately outside the 
facility, and that large groups of individuals congregated in front, 
intimidating residents of the area. Justice Murphey, dissenting, 
argued that revocation of license and increased police protection in 
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N.Y.S.2d at 490. 
88 Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 COLUM. L. 
REv. 781 (1952). 
87 See e.g., Boccardo v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 858 (N.D. 
Cal. 1972); Shields v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 31 Wash. 247, 
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Note, Nuisance and Legislative Authorization, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 
781, 782-83 (1952). 
89 319 A.2d 871, 883 n. 12 (1974). But see, Commonwealth ex rel. 
Shumaker v. New York and Pennsylvania Company, Inc., 367 Pa. 
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a 'nuisance,' not a 'nuisance' ... " 
90 22 Cal. App.3d 116, 99 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1971). 
91 ld. at 131, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 360. 
92 ld. at 129, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 359. 
93 386 Mich. 598, 194 N.W.2d 365 (1972). 
94_Id. at 606, 194 N.W.2d at 368. 
951d. at 607, 194 N.W.2d at 369. Note that this was a damage 
action, based on both nuisance and negligence, for injuries resulting 
when plaintiff's car struck the flashing light signal. The court made 
little attempt to distinguish the two theories. It may be that agency 
authorization is a weaker bar to public nuisance actions where 
negligent conduct is the cause of an ensuing nuisance. 
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.. 509 P.2d 588 (Colo. 1973). 
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98 509 P.2d at 589. 
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relief is not available to private plaintiffs when the injury to defen-
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remedy. 
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Note that the Colorado Constitution contains no explicit reference 
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110 At least one state has such a provision. See, Fla. Stat. Ann. § 
403.412(2)(a) (1973), allowing private citizens to bring mandamus 
proceedings to compel state agencies to enforce environmental legis-
lation. 
III See, Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Company, 26 N.Y.2d 219,309 
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